About

I am a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Arkansas. I received my Ph.D. from the University of Rochester. I will be on the job market in 2025–2026.

My research interests are in Macroeconomics, Banking, and International Finance.

Job Market Paper

A Model of Bank Failures: Funding Frictions and the Dynamics Before Collapse

This paper develops a quantitative model of bank failures to examine how funding frictions shape balance-sheet pressures and the timing of default. Banks in the model face limited commitment, capital regulation, and costly access to illiquid liabilities. By issuing both deposits and time deposits, they manage short-run liquidity needs but increase their future repayment obligations and exposure to default. Default arises endogenously when equity falls below regulatory thresholds. The model shows that liability composition is a central determinant of banks’ resilience: long-term funding mitigates rollover risk and supports smoother cash flows in normal times, but heightens vulnerability once profitability and asset quality deteriorate. This dual role of time deposits generates the gradual rise in leverage, tightening margins, and accelerating credit losses that precede failure. The analysis demonstrates that funding structure is a key driver of bank stability and of the dynamics that push distressed institutions toward default.